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NOTES
THERE MAY BE HARM IN ASKING:
HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATIONS AND THE
FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE
A homosexual solicitation, most often a circumspect and consensual occurrence,
is nevertheless a crime in manyjurisdictions. This Note examines the legitimacy of
such statutoryproscriotions within the context of judicial lines drawn between merely
offensive speech, which may fall within the guarantees of the first amendment, and
"ghting words," which are not accordedfrst amendmentprotection. The Note eval-
uates devices available to a courtfaced with a constitutional attack on a solicitation
statute, concentrating on the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth, and concludes
with specflcproposalsfor reform of such legislation topromote legitimate state inter-
ests whileprotecting the first amendment rights of homosexuals.
INTRODUCTION
A solicitation to engage in homosexual activity' is often a clan-destine and discreet occurrence. The two people involved usu-
ally know one another, know of each other's sexual preference,
and exchange positive assurances-either verbal or nonver-
bal-before a proposition is actually made.2 Such solicitations are
rarely the subject of judicial inquiry, for neither party to a consen-
sual proposition is likely to protest. Yet such solicitation is a
crime in most jurisdictions, and may be brought to the attention of
law enforcement authorities by either party if the relationship
goes awry, by an offended addressee, or by an addressee who is a
police decoy.3 A court may then subject the solicitor to criminal
liability for importuning, breaching the peace, or loitering for the
purpose of soliciting.4
1. Throughout this Note, the term "homosexual solicitation" refers to a request to
engage in noncommercial, consensual sexual activity, spoken by an adult actor, the solici-
tor, to another adult of the same sex, the addressee. Unless otherwise noted, the sex of the
parties is immaterial, although most of the cases considered here involve males.
This Note does not deal with solicitation for prostitution, which is generally treated
under separate legislation and constitutional doctrine.
2. See note 169 infra and accompanying text.
3. In California, for example, an overwhelming majority of arrests for homosexual
solicitation arise from the use of "decoy" police officers. Project, The Consenting Adult
Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los
Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643, 691 (1966).
4. For a discussion of statutes imposing liability on these grounds, see notes 149-65
infra and accompanying text.
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Kenneth Phipps was one such solicitor, whose proposition to a
plainclothes Cincinnati policeman was vulgar as well as badly
timed.5 He was convicted of homosexual solicitation under Ohio
Revised Code section 2907.07(B), which prohibits "solicit[ing] a
person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity with the of-
fendor, when the offendor knows such solicitation is offensive to
the other person, or is reckless in that regard."' 6 On appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court, Phipps challenged the constitutionality of
the statute on the grounds that it inhibited his freedom of speech
in violation of the first amendment. He argued that the statute
was both vague because its language was ambiguous, 7 and over-
broad because it regulated both protected and unprotected
speech.8 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the vagueness claim,9
and skirted the overbreadth claim by construing the statute to ap-
ply only to "fighting words"- those words which by their utter-
ance incite a breach of the peace.' 0
State v. Phiops provides a convenient point of departure for an
examination of the legal sanctions against homosexual solicita-
tion. First, it invokes the fighting words doctrine to avoid conflict
with first amendment guarantees. Consequently, this Note begins
by tracing judicial interpretations of "fighting words" to show
how an initially broad exception to first amendment protections is
of more limited application today.It
Second, Phpps raises two significant first amendment issues:
vagueness and overbreadth. Each doctrine defines a specific con-
5. Phipps drove up to a street comer and, from his automobile, said to the decoy
policeman, "Hop in, let's go have sex." The decoy looked into the back seat and Phipps
retorted, "You look paranoid, come on in, I want to suck your dick."
State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (1979).
6. OHIo REV. CODE § 2907.07(B) (Page 1976). Though Ohio law prohibits homosex-
ual solicitation, consensual homosexual activity has been legal in Ohio since 1974. 1972
Ohio Laws, 134 v H 511 § 2 (effective January 1, 1974). The inconsistencies inherent in
penalizing solicitation for a legal act are discussed at notes 178-82 infra and accompanying
text.
7. The vagueness doctrine is discussed at notes 60-73 infra and accompanying text.
8. The overbreadth doctrine is discussed at notes 74-115 infra and accompanying
text.
9. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 273, 389 N.E.2d at 1131.
10. Id. at 275-80, 389 N.E.2d at 1133-34. Invoking the notion of "fighting words,"
the court cited the Committee Comment to § 2907.07(B), which states that "[Tihe rationale
for prohibiting indiscreet solicitation of deviate conduct is that the solicitation itself can be
highly repugnant to the person solicited, and there is a risk that it may provoke a violent
response." Id. at 279, 389 N.E.2d at 1134 (emphasis by the court). The validity of this
rationale is discussed at note 202 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 16-78 infra and accompanying text.
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stitutional infirmity and serves as a tool either to invalidate or to
limit the applicability of a statute which regulates speech. This
Note examines each doctrine in light of the fighting words excep-
tion and discusses its application, limitations, and current utility. 2
Third, Phipps deals with a statute which makes homosexual
solicitation a crime. This Note analyzes legislation regulating ho-
mosexual solicitation-both by an investigation of the policy un-
derpinnings of such legislation and the statutory techniques which
characterize it.' 3 This analysis includes an evaluation of the op-
tions available to a court faced with a constitutional attack on a
solicitation statute. Finally, the Note proposes specific statutory
reforms which, it is suggested, will both promote legitimate state
interests and protect the first amendment rights of homosexuals. 4
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Fighting Words Doctrine
The fighting words doctrine evolved from the notion that the
first amendment's broad prohibition against laws "abridging the
freedom of speech" is not absolute.'" The Supreme Court has
long suggested that speech which unjustifiably endangers the pub-
lic or some other superior interest' 6 may legitimately be regulated.
This notion, grounded in common sense, is exemplified by Justice
Holmes' observation that "[t]he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater
and causing a panic."' 7
However, a standard based on common sense alone provides
12. See notes 59-116 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 117-201 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 202-12 infra and accompanying text.
15. For a thoughtful analysis of the evolution of the fighting words doctrine, see Shea,
Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That-Fighting Words and the First Amendment,
63 Ky. L.J. 1 (1974).
16. National security is sometimes said to be an interest superior to first amendment
interests, and the holding in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), is sometimes cited
as support. This is immaterial as Whitney was overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969). Dictum in prior restraint cases leads to the suggestion that under some circum-
stances-never fully articulated-national security may preempt first amendment guaran-
tees. "IT]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited .... No
one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1930). See also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 727, (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
17. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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the judiciary with little if no guidance. Thus, in 1942, the
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire's delineated the
classes of speech which could legitimately be proscribed: obscen-
ity,19 libel,20 and "fighting words."
At issue in Chaplinsky was the constitutionality of a New
Hampshire statute which prohibited the use of "offensive, deri-
sive, or annoying" words in public places.2' Chaplinsky was a
minister of Jehovah's Witnesses who, in the course of street comer
evangelizing, described organized religion as a "racket" 22 and
continued his harangue despite a policeman's warning to "go
slow."' 23 According to Chaplinsky, a marshal who escorted him
from the scene referred to him as a "damned bastard,"'24 to which
Chaplinsky responded, "You are a God damned racketeer and a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fas-
cists or agents of Fascists. ' 25 Because of this response, Chaplinsky
was charged and convicted under the New Hampshire statute.26
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in affirming the convic-
tion, limited the application of the statute to speech which would
"cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed. '27 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, took a broader view. Justice Murphy, speaking for a unani-
mous court, insisted that
[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utter-
18. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
19. Id. at 572. Homosexual solicitation may be analyzed exclusively as obscenity.
Compare Silva v. Municipal Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974) with
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979) (overrul-
ing Silva on other grounds, but referring to obscenity analysis as a "misunderstanding," id.
at 249, 599 P.2d at 642, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 336). However, analysis of homosexual solicita-
tion as obscenity is beyond the scope of this Note.
20. 315 U.S. at 572.
21. N.H. PUB. LAWS ch. 378, § 2 (1926), asamendedby N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570:2
(1955) (repealed 1973 and superseded by N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644).
22. 315 U.S. at 570.
23. State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (1941).
24. Id. at 316, 18 A.2d at 759. The marshall apparently denied making the statement.
315 U.S. at 570.
25. 315 U.S. at 569.
26. Id.
27. 91 N.H. at 313, 18 A.2d at 758. This construction foreshadowed the doctrine of
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), discussed at notes 89-96 infra and accompanying
text.
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ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas ....28
One commentator has suggested that this passage delineates
the three elements of what has come to be called the fighting
words doctrine.29 The first element is the notion that expression
must be an "essential part of [the] exposition of ideas" to merit
protection. The classes of speech cited in Chaplinsky formed "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas" and were of "slight social
value as a step to truth."30 This narrow conception of constitu-
tionally protected expression was eroded seven years after
Chaplinsky when, in Winters v. New York,3 the Court reversed
the obscenity conviction of a crime-magazine peddler.32 Justice
Reed stated: "The line between the informing and the entertain-
ing is too elusive [to be constitutionally distinct],"33 thus extending
the protection of the first amendment to a form of "entertain-
ment" which scarcely constituted an "essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas" as required by Chaplinsky.
The second element of the fighting words doctrine consists of
the types of injury such language may cause, against which the
language's value must be weighed. Justice Murphy spoke first of
words "which by their very utterance inflict injury" 34 or, as one
commentator has characterized the harm, "injury to the 'sensibili-
ties' of addressees or auditors. ' 35 These emotional or psychic in-
juries have no physical manifestations-a factor which may
present the problem of proving an intangible injury.36 However,
as this Note will argue, the use of language which inflicts severe
emotional injury is surely within legislative reach.37
The third element of the doctrine is the tendency of the utter-
ance "to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 38 This in-
28. 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
29. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1974).
30. 315 U.S. at 572.
31. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
32. Id. at 520. Winters was convicted under an obscenity statute which prohibited te
publication of "stories of... bloodshed, lust or crime." Id. at 508.
33. Id. at 510.
34. 315 U.S. at 572.
35. Rutzick, supra note 29, at 6. Addressees are persons to whom the language is
directly addressed, while auditors are those who hear the words outside of the speaker's
immediate vicinity.
36. Id. at 7.
37. See notes 207-09 infra and accompanying text.
38. 315 U.S. at 572.
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volves a behavioral assumption of some magnitude-that an
average citizen may be incited to violence by mere words.39
Though this assumption may be challenged,40 it is the linchpin of
the fighting words doctrine. Moreover, the assumption runs a neat
arc around the first amendment: if mere words may trigger an
uncontrollable violent response, the only method of avoiding such
response is to prohibit the words themselves. 4' Thus, the focus of
state regulation is shifted from the addressee who responds vio-
lently to the "cause" of his violence, the speaker's utterance.
The strength of this assumption was diminished somewhat in
Terminiello v. City of Chicago,4" which recognized that not all pro-
vocative speech may be regulated. Terminiello, a priest, had lam-
basted Jews and blacks in an address to a veterans group, and
some 1000 demonstrators outside the hall reacted violently.43 In
reversing Terminiello's conviction for inciting a breach of the
peace, the Court noted that "[s]peech is often provocative and
challenging. .. [and] is nevertheless protected against censorship
or punishment."'  The Court's recognition of the value of emo-
tionally stirring speech undercuts the nice logic of the "incite-
ment" element of Chaplinsky, for it indicates that notwithstanding
the uncontrollable violence such speech elicits, the state may not
punish the speaker.
The interests Chaplinsky sought to protect-that of the lis-
tener's sensibilities and that of the state in the peace of its
streets-were served by the fighting words doctrine well through
the 1960's.4 5 In 1971, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
Cohen v. California46 drastically curtailed the states' ability to
shelter those interests. In Cohen, the Court first drew a distinction
39. Rutzick, supra note 29, at 8.
40. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1972), discussed at notes 46-58
infra and accompanying text.
41. Rutzick, supra note 29, at 8.
42. 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 4.
45. E.g. Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the
court, reversing the conviction of a man who called a policeman a "son of a bitch," never-
theless recognized the state's "legitimate interest in stopping one person from 'inflict[ing]
injury' on others by verbally assaulting them." Id. at 646. Despite this affirmation of an
interest in the addressee's sensibilities, the court required that the communication be
"grossly offensive" in order to sustain a conviction. Id. For an elaboration of this concept,
see note 206 infra and accompanying text. See also Karp v. Collins, 310 F. Supp. 627
(D.N.J. 1970) (requiring that "offensive" words be spoken with intention of disturbing lis-
tener in order to invoke sensibilities interest).
46. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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between language which is merely offensive and language which
constitutes "fighting words," holding the former to be within the
protection of the first amendment. Kenneth Cohen was observed
outside a California courtroom with the words "Fuck the Draft"
emblazoned on his jacket.47 Although he neither included nor
threatened violence, Cohen was arrested and convicted under
California's breach of the peace statute.48 The California Court of
Appeals upheld the conviction, holding that "'offensive conduct'
means 'behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of
violence or to in turn disturb the peace.' ",4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in certain instances
seemingly offensive expression deserves first amendment protec-
tion. As Justice Harl nnoted: "We cannot lose sight of the fact
that, in what may seem a trifling and annoying instance of indi-
vidual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal
values are truly implicated."5 Further, the Cohen court intro-
duced the requirement that the offended hearer be the actual ad-
dressee5 ' of the offensive speech, 2 rather than merely an
anonymous auditor. Justice Harlan pointed out that there was
"no showing that anyone who saw Cohen was, in fact, violently
aroused ... ,,5 suggesting for the first time that regulation of
offensive expression cannot depend on the presence of a merely
"hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless. . ."' Justice
Harlan could find nothing on the record in Cohen indicating that
"substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out
physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities. .. .- 1
In short, offensive expression could no longer be prohibited
simply because it created an undifferentiated fear of harm; there
had to be an objectively legitimate affront to the actual addressee's
47. Id. at 16. Upon entering the courtroom, Cohen removed his jacket and stood with
it folded over his arm so that the words at issue were visible to no one. Meanwhile, a
policeman sent the presiding judge a note suggesting that Cohen be held in contempt of
court. The judge declined to do so, and Cohen was arrested by the officer only after he
emerged from the courtroom. Id. at 19 n.3.
48. The statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970), prohibits "maliciously and
wilfully disturb[ing] the peace . . . by . . . offensive conduct." 403 U.S. at 16.
49. 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969).
50. 403 U.S. at 25.
51. See Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie, Fighting Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DEPAUL
L. REv. 259 (1979).
52. 403 U.S. at 20. Accord, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).
53. 403 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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sensibilities. A majority of the Court found no such affront in Co-
hen's case: "No individual actually or likely to be present [in the
courthouse] could reasonably have regarded the words on appel-
lant's jacket as a direct personal insult."'5 6 By this logic, Cohen
drastically limited the degree to which states might defer to a lis-
tener's sensibilities. The Supreme Court's holding was a logical
consequence of the realization that "one man's vulgarity is an-
other man's lyric."57
Yet, Cohen went even further: it recognized that the emotive
content of offensive speech deserves just as much first amendment
protection as its cognitive content. 8 After Cohen, vulgar or offen-
sive expression is admissible to the protected class of "ideas" lead-
ing to "truth", from which it had been excluded in Chaplinsky.
Thus, after Cohen, only one of the elements of the Chaplinsky
doctrine remains intact: the interest of the state in preventing a
breach of the peace. As a result of the limitations drawn by the
Cohen majority on the original doctrine, the interest in the lis-
tener's sensibilities appears emasculated, if not eliminated alto-
gether. Moreover, the speaker need not tread so lightly upon his
listener's emotions: so long as cognitive content is perceptible, the
emotive component merits protection.
B. The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines. Tools of Judicial
Control
The fighting words doctrine, as enunciated in Chaplinsky and
redefined in Cohen, limits the power of a legislature to regulate
speech with respect to the particular incident to which the doctrine
is applied. However, in reviewing a statute which regulates ex-
pression, a court may look beyond the legitimacy of its application
in an individual case. As a result of legislative zeal to regulate
certain kinds of expression, a statute may be facially unconstitu-
tional, irrespective of the facts of a particular case, because its lan-
guage is either vague or overbroad. Although they overlap
considerably in practice,59 vagueness and overbreadth are distinct
56. Id. at 20.
57. Id. at 25.
58. Id. at 26. The Court rejected "the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated." Id Cf., e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1948), discussed in text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
59. See Note, First Amendment Vagueness and Overbreadth: Theoretical Revisions by
the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REv. 609, 611 (1978).
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constitutional doctrines.
1. The Doctrine of Vagueness
A statute designed to restrict expression may be held void for
vagueness when its language is not specific enough to inform the
average person of precisely what activity is prohibited. In Grayned
v. City of Rockford, ° the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine
of vagueness, grounded upon the notice element of due process, 6'
protects three interests. First, a defendant must be able to ascer-
tain precisely what conduct is prohibited. A statute which is so
vague that "men of common intelligence must ordinarily guess at
its meaning" 62 deprives the defendant of that certainty, and may
trap an unintentional violator by providing insufficient warning of
that which is prohibited.63 Second, the citizenry must be free from
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of law. Vague laws, by
failing to provide explicit standards of conduct, open wide the
door for official harassment. 64 Finally, any statute which restricts
first amendment freedoms necessarily has a "chilling effect" on
the exercise of those freedoms: citizens will be deterred from ex-
pressing themselves for fear of capricious enforcement. A vague
statute intensifies the chilling effect by inducing citizens to "'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone' .. than if the boundaries [of the
law] had been clearly marked. 65
It is difficult to determine precisely how specific 66 a statute
must be to survive a vagueness challenge; there are a number of
factors to be weighed in the decision. On one hand, it has long
been recognized that it is impossible to set a rigid standard of
60. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
61. Id. at 108.
62. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967) (holding that a statute requiring the
name of a "printer" on all handbills was unconstitutionally vague).
63. 408 U.S. at 108.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
66. Even a statute which quite clearly prohibits the defendant's acts can be subject to a
vagueness attack by that same defendant. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971), where Justice White, dissenting on other grounds, noted that "[a]lIthough a statute
may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged
against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional
overbreadth as applied to others." Id. at 619. Such an approach has necessitated a relaxa-
tion of the general rules of standing. The Burger Court has, however, intimated that one
who violates the "hard core" of a statute--that conduct that a reasonable person would
know would be prohibited under the statute-may be estopped from asserting its vague-
ness. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974). See generally Note, supra note 59, at 629-34.
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specificity; the limits of the English language67 and of the legisla-
ture's ability to anticipate possible fact patterns 68 make near-abso-
lute precision an unfair demand. Moreover, a court may have
trouble perceiving the distinction between a merely ambiguous
statute - which can be rescued from invalidation by a narrowing
construction - and a statute which plainly is vague and must fall
because it is not susceptible of any meaning.69
On the other hand, despite sympathy for the limitations on
precision in statutory craftsmanship, the first amendment de-
mands great specificity whenever expression is the target of the
legislation. The Supreme Court has stated that "stricter standards
of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the
less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemina-
tion of ideas may be the loser."70
Faced with the demand for, and absence of, the requisite spec-
ificity in statutory language, the Supreme Court often takes into
account the judicial gloss which state courts may have placed on a
given statute.7' As a result, a state court construction which nar-
rows the meaning of an otherwise vague statute may protect that
statute from a vagueness challenge. 72 However, if the state does
not so construe its statutes, the Supreme Court is not obligated to
do so, and may strike down the statute altogether.73
2. The Doctrine of Overbreadth
The doctrine of overbreadth, like that of vagueness, seeks to
alleviate the chilling effect inherent in regulation of speech, as well
as the threat of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. How-
67. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
68. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 84 (1972).
69. Id. at 87. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67, 76-85 (1960).
70. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).
71. Compare Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), discussed in note 31 supra,
with Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), where the Court defined the "crime against nature"
language of a Tennessee sodomy statute according to an interpretation of the same lan-
guage by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
72. Since all citizens are assumed to know the law, they also are assumed to know of a
court's limiting construction of a law. For criticism of this logic, see Note, supra note 69, at
73.
73. Id. at 86. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (contempt-of-flag stat-
ute, not construed by Massachusetts courts, held void for vagueness); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (loitering ordinance, not construed by Ohio courts, held
void for vagueness).
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ever, overbreadth and vagueness have their origins in theoretically
distinct foundations. The vagueness doctrine analyzes the mean-
ing of the words of a statute, while overbreadth is concerned with
the coverage of the statute. The overbreadth doctrine is founded
on the notion that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."'74 Thus, a statute
may be sufficiently precise in its terms to survive a vagueness chal-
lenge, yet those terms may encompass both protected and unpro-
tected expression within the statute's prohibition. This is the
paradigm of unconstitutional overbreadth.
As with vagueness, the requirements for standing to bring an
overbreadth challenge are relaxed." Classic overbreadth scrutiny
considers only the scope of the statute as it applies to the defend-
ant's particular expression.76 However, since 1940 the Court has
considered hypothetical unconstitutional applications as wel, 7 7
and has held the nature of the defendant's own conduct to be im-
material to the inquiry.78
The pivotal question in an overbreadth challenge is whether
the measure of protected expression encompassed by the statute
must be minimal or substantial for the statute to be struck down.
Until 1973, a statute which was overbroad to the slightest degree,
regulating any protected expression, was sufficiently overbroad to
be invalidated.79 However, in 1973, the Court announced a new
standard: "[Plarticularly where conduct and not merely speech is
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the stat-
ute's plainly legitimate sweep."8 This shift to a requirement of
substantial overbreadth is founded on the notion that where the
degree of overbreadth is de minimus, there will rarely be occasion
74. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (holding that registration require-
ments for foreign corporations, applied to prohibit NAACP activities, were overbroad).
For the most comprehensive survey of the overbreadth doctrine, see Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
75. See note 66 supra.
76. See Note, supra note 74, at 844.
77. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) in which a loitering statute as
applied to labor picketing was judged on its face, not on the merits of its application.
78. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964).
79. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
80. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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for it to chill protected expression."'
Traditionally, an overbroad statute has been held facially in-
valid and struck down in its entirety. 2 This policy is consistent
with the chilling effect rationale-that first amendment freedoms
should not be exercised at the citizen's peril. However, the recent
trend has been to avoid facial invalidation13 by remanding the
case to the state court for a limiting construction of the statute.
Although this practice permits the legitimate aims of the legisla-
tion to be left intact, consistent with the goal of judicial restraint,8 4
it also leaves certain questions unanswered. First, state courts
may be unable to attach a constitutional construction to a statute
with unconstitutional underpinnings.8 5 Moreover, constitution-
ally protected expression may remain illegitimately regulated
while the state court is deliberating on a limiting construction of
the statute.86 Irrespective of these difficulties, remands for a limit-
ing construction are now the dominant judicial remedy for over-
breadth. 7
Since 1972, the Court has used the overbreadth doctrine as its
primary tool to implement the rule of Cohen v. California,88 that
offensive speech does not, without more, amount to "fighting
words." The Court first invoked the overbreadth doctrine in
Gooding v. Wilson,89 where the defendant, during a scuffle with
police who were breaking up an antiwar demonstration, ex-
claimed to an officer: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you" and
81. The Broadrick Court reasoned that "there comes a point where [a chilling ef-
fect]-at best a prediction--cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its
face and so prohibiting a state from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly
within its power to proscribe." Id.
It is apparent that the Broadrick analysis was largely grounded in the critique of tradi-
tional overbreadth doctrine found in Note, supra note 74, at 859. Despite contentions that
the substantial overbreadth doctrine is not susceptible of easy definition and that it is really
little different from traditional doctrine, 413 U.S. at 622 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the test of
Broadrick is law, and despite the more stringent standard, statutes have fallen in its wake.
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (city ordinance banning
exhibition of films containing nudity at drive-in theatres when the screen is visible from a
public street or place voided for substantial overbreadth).
82. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940).
83. See Note, supra note 59, at 616-20.
84. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919, 924 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. For a more detailed criticism of the remand-for-limitation policy, see Note, supra
note 59, at 623-25.
87. See note I ll infra and accompanying text.
88. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
89. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
[Vol. 30:461
HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATIONS
"You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death." 0 ' He was convicted
under a Georgia breach of the peace statute which read: "Any
person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and
in his presence. . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tend-
ing to cause a breach of the peace. . . shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor."91
Faced with a claim that the Georgia statute was overbroad, the
Supreme Court reversed Wilson's conviction, holding that a "stat-
ute must be carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to
protected expression." 92 The Court applied the Chaplinsky and
Cohen distinction between unprotected "fighting words" and pro-
tected "offensive" expression, finding that the terms "opprobrious
and abusive" in the Georgia statute, as construed by the Georgia
courts, went beyond fighting words to include protected speech.
The statute was thus held to be void for overbreadth. 93
The Gooding decision raises several noteworthy points. First,
by combining the overbreadth and fighting words doctrines, the
Court provided a model for adjudicating constitutional challenges
to laws regulating offensive expression.94 Second, the Court's
analysis reinforced the substantive changes in the fighting words
doctrine already articulated in Cohen. The Georgia Court of Ap-
peals had construed the statute as expressly protecting the lis-
tener's sensibilities;9" by invalidating that construction, the
Supreme Court underscored Cohen's repudiation of that interest.
In addition, the Court seemed to emphasize the necessity of vio-
lent reaction by the actual addressee, 96 an essential feature of the
Cohen modification of Chaplinsky. In short, Gooding provided
the means by which Cohen could be effectuated: a method of stat-
90. Id. at 519-20 n.l.
91. Id. at 519 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (GA. CEuM. CODE § 26-2610
(1977))).
92. Id. at 522.
93. Id. at 525.
94. See, e.g., State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979), discussed in
text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
95. See also Samuels v. State, 103 Ga. App. 66, 118 S.E.2d 231 (1961), in which the
Georgia Court of Appeals, in reviewing breach of the peace convictions of two blacks who
had sought to be served at an all white lunch counter, stated that "[tihe term 'breach of the
peace' is generic, and includes all violations of the public peace or order or decorum. ...
By 'peace', as used in this connection is meant the tranquility enjoyed by the citizens
. Id. at 67, 118 S.E.2d at 232.
96. 405 U.S. at 524.
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utory construction which applied overbroad statutes only to un-
protected expression-"fighting words" as defined by Cohen.
Shortly after Gooding the Court again took the opportunity to
apply its overbreadth analysis to "fighting words." It summarily
vacated and remanded for reconsideration three cases, one in light
of Gooding, and the other two in light of Cohen. In the first of this
trilogy of cases, Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,9 7 the defendant had ad-
dressed a local school board, using the word "motherfucker" re-
peatedly. He was convicted under a New Jersey statute
prohibiting "loud or offensive or profane or indecent language."98
The New Jersey Supreme Court had construed the statute to ap-
ply only to language which provoked a breach of the peace or
disturbed the sensibilities of the listener.99
The United States Supreme Court's remand in light of Good-
ing reflected its apparent displeasure with a construction that pro-
tects listener sensibilities. 100 Content with the New Jersey
Supreme Court's construction, Justice Powell argued in dissent
that "Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere utterance en-
tails a high probability of an outbreak of physical violence. It also
extends to the willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend
the sensibilities of an unwilling audience."'' Thus, Justice Powell
would restore Chaplinsky in its original form to the extent of pro-
tecting sensibilities, though only where they are offended will-
fully. 102
The second case of the trilogy, Lewis v. City of New Orleans
(Lewis I), °3 involved a mother who addressed police officers ar-
resting her son as "God damn motherfucking police." She was
convicted under a city ordinance which prohibited any person
from wantonly cursing, reviling, or using "obscene or opprobrious
language" toward a police officer on duty.'" Since the Louisiana
courts had not construed the ordinance, the Court remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Cohen, apparently for its anal-
97. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
98. Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:170-29(i) (1971)).
99. Id. (quoting State v. Profasci, 56 N.J. 346, 266 A.2d 579 (1970)).
100. The New Jersey Supreme Court shared the Supreme Court's displeasure with the
protection of sensibilities when, upon reconsideration, it held the statute to be overbroad.
State v. Rosenfeld, 120 N.J. Super. 458, 295 A.2d I (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
101. 408 U.S. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102. As this Note contends, Justice Powell's observations may have merit in the area of
homosexual solicitation. See notes 207-09 infra and accompanying text.
103. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
104. Id. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ysis of "fighting words," and Gooding, to provide the overbreadth
analysis. Justice Powell concurred in this result, stating that al-
though Lewis' utterance would be "fighting words" if addressed to
a citizen, "the situation may be different where such words are
addressed to a peace officer trained to exercise a higher degree of
restraint than the average citizen."'
t0 5
Lewis v. City of New Orleans again reached the Supreme Court
after the Louisiana Supreme Court, following the command of
Lewis I, authoritiatively construed the New Orleans ordinance.
On remand, the Louisiana court narrowed the purview of the or-
dinance to "'fighting words' uttered to specific persons at a spe-
cific time. .... ,106 In Lewis 11,107 however, the Supreme Court
held that the ordinance was still overbroad, and reversed. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the Louisiana court
made no "meaningful attempt to limit or properly define-as lim-
ited by Chaplinsky and Gooding--'opprobrious' or indeed any
other term" in the statute.0 8 The Lewis II decision leaves unan-
swered the question how, short of invalidation, the New Orleans
ordinance could have been "meaningfully" limited in its construc-
tion. Consequently, it is questionable whether "authoritative con-
struction" which leaves facially overbroad language intact could
survive scrutiny.
The final case of the trilogy, Brown v. Oklahoma, t0 9 involved a
member of the Black Panther party who referred to police as
"motherfucking fascist pig cops" during a political meeting. The
Court vacated his conviction for using "obscene or lascivious"
language" t0 and, since the statute had not been previously con-
105. Id. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring). In distinguishing police from other citizens,
Justice Powell apparently would add yet another proviso to the protection of sensibilities:
an inquiry into the status of the addressee and whether it equips him or her with a special
degree of self-restraint. Cf Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), where Justice
Stewart indicated that conduct may not be constitutionally regulated "through the enact-
ment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend on whether or
not a policeman is annoyed." Id. at 614.
106. City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La. 809, 826, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (1972).
107. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
108. Id. at 133. The Court, as it had in Gooding, dwelled on the word "opprobrious,"
holding it to be clearly more broad than a fighting words construction would permit. An
unspoken premise of the reversal seems to be the Supreme Court's apparent disagreement
with the Louisiana court's conclusion that Lewis' language was within the bounds of "fight-
ing words."
109. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
110. Id. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 906
(1958)).
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strued, remanded for reconsideration in light of both Cohen and
Gooding.
Since Gooding and the Rosenfeld-Lewis-Brown trilogy, the
Court has been less deferential to the state courts, occasionally
summarily reversing convictions for "using profane language""'
and rarely commenting on its remands for reconsideration in light
of Gooding. A notable exception was Lucas v. Arkansas,' where
the defendant was overheard to say "look at that chicken-shit
motherfucker" in reference to a police officer. Defendant's con-
viction for using "profane, violent, vulgar, abusive or insulting
language,"' 13 was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Lewis II, with two Justices dissenting from the remand.
Justice Blackmun argued that the Arkansas Supreme Court's con-
struction of the statute' 14 sufficiently met the demands of Gooding,
while Justice Douglas found nothing to be gained by remanding
the case; he felt the statute was not salvageable and argued for
summary reversal.' "'
The frequency of summary decisions suggests that the Cohen
modification of the doctrine and the Gooding mode of analysis are
now firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of vulgarity. The
Ohio Supreme Court's understanding of the current relationship
,between offensive expression and "fighting words" is illuminating:
"[N]o matter how rude, abusive, offensive, derisive, vulgar, insult-
ing, crude, profane or opprobrious spoken words may seem to be,
their utterance may not be made a crime unless they are fighting
words . " 116
The remainder of this Note will focus on one type of expres-
sion, homosexual solicitation, to explore whether it may be regu-
lated under the "fighting words" standard of Cohen, and how
courts may approach its vagueness and overbreadth problems ac-
cording to Gooding.
111. E.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Cason v. City of Colum-
bus, 409 U.S. 1053 (1972).
112. 416 U.S. 919 (1974)(mem.).
113. Id. n.I (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1412 (1964)).
114. See Lucas v. Arkansas, 254 Ark. 584, 494 S.W.2d 705 (1973). The Lucas dissents
reflect doubt about the efficacy of remanding in light of Lewis If which, as has been
demonstrated, provides virtually no guidelines to state courts. See notes 107-08 supra and
accompanying text.
115. 416 U.S. at 924.
116. City of Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St.2d 107, 110, 314 N.E.2d 162, 164 (1974)
(holding the defendant's statement, "I hate all you fucking cops" to be "fighting words").
476 [Vol. 30:461
HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATIONS
II. THE REGULATION OF HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATION
Proscription of homosexual solicitation is part of a broad sys-
tem of regulation of homosexual activity which directly affects a
significant minority of the population." 7 Although no state
makes homosexuality per se criminal,"" sexual preference is
nonetheless the subject of discrimination under the law. Laws
regulating teaching qualifications," 9 marriages,120 and corpora-
tions12' often discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Fur-
ther, employment discrimination against homosexuals contributes
117. Owing to the often circumspect nature of a homosexual's sexual identity, accurate
data concerning the number of homosexuals in the United States are lacking. However, at
least one research study indicates that the number is significant, and that there are more
homosexual men than women. - See Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect? 8 LINCOLN L.
REV. 24, 31 (1973). It has been estimated that only 15% of male, and 5% of female, homo-
sexuals would be recognized as such by the average person. Pomeroy, Homosexuality, in
THE SAME SEx, AN APPRAISAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 11 (R. Weltge ed. 1969).
118. The criminal status of homosexuality may be compared to that of drug addiction:
though the addiction itself is not illegal, the procurement, possession, or sale of narcotics is.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In a like manner, though it is not
criminal to be homosexual, it may be criminal to engage in or solicit homosexual acts.
119. The legal rights of homosexual teachers have been the subject of much contro-
versy. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 19, 47-53 (1977). All states have legislation
permitting the revocation of teaching credentials or certificates for immorality, unprofes-
sionalism, or moral turpitude. Horenstein, Homosexuals in the Teaching Profession, 20
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 125 (1961). Homosexuality is considered to fall within all three catego-
ries. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the
United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 861 (1979).
In reviewing a homosexual's discharge from a teaching position, courts may require a
rational nexus between the teacher's homosexuality and his or her unfitness for teaching.
See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969). However, where sexual behavior, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is flagrant,
this alone may constitute unfitness to teach. See, e.g., Pettit v. State, 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d
889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973) (school teacher held unfit to teach because of her participa-
tion in, and public discussion of, "non-conventional" heterosexual behavior). See also
Board of Educ. of Long Beach v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 602, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1977).
120. No court has recognized the validity of a homosexual marriage, though a number
of couples have litigated the issue. Generally, the courts have refused to interpret the word
"marriage" in marriage statutes to mean anything but traditional heterosexual marriage.
See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 311-12, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (1971); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247,
249-50, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974). See generally Note, The Legality of HomosexualMar-
riage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1974).
121. A homosexual organization may be denied the status of a nonprofit corporation if-
the state feels that such organizations serve "unlawful purposes," e.g., Grant V. Brown, 39
Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974); Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 66 Misc. 2d
456, 320 N.Y.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971), or are neither "benevolent [n]or charitable," e.g., In re
Thom Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 787, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588
(1972). See also Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Associa-
tion, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1062-74 (1979).
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to their disfavored status. 122
More significant to this inquiry is the use of sodomy statutes to
suppress homosexual activity. These laws, once universal and still
in force in twenty-nine states, 123 are the historical tools of such
suppression. Although their use of the terms "sodomy," "unnatu-
ral and lascivious act," and "abominable crime against nature,"'12
4
may render them definitionally infirm, sodomy laws have never-
theless withstood vagueness attacks 25 and continue to make ho-
mosexual acts a crime. 1
26
122. Discrimination against homosexuals in private sector employment is thought to be
quite common though documentation is difficult because homosexuals are not readily iden-
tifiable. Rivera, supra note 119, at 806. Litigation resulting from such discrimination is
rare.
The civil service has been the target of what little employment discrimination litigation
there has been. Again, some courts require a challenged employer to show a rational nexus
between the prospective or former employee's homosexuality and job performance. See,
e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (homosexuality of NASA employee
did not impair his job efficiency); Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D.
399 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (possibility of a public contempt charge an invalid justification for
dismissal of homosexual civil servants). But see Singer v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (em-
ployee's open flaunting homosexuality per se constitutes "rational nexus").
123. Currently operative sodomy statutes are: ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 6-65(a)(3) (1978);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, -1412 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1813 (1977);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002
(1977); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3505 (1974); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 510.100 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1978); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553, 554 (Michie Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 34, 35
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, .159, .338, .338a (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-505 (Supp. 1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3124 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1 (1969); S.C. CODE
§ 16-15-120 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp.
1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West Supp. 1979).
124. These definitional infirmities include determining which acts are covered by a par-
ticular statute and to whom the statute applies. See generally Note, Sodomy Statutes-A
Needfor a Change, 13 S.D. L. REv. 384 (1968).
125. See, e.g., Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (sustaining Florida Supreme
Court's construction of the term "abominable crime against nature"); Bell v. State, 289 So.
2d 388 (Fla. 1973) (holding that statutory reference to "lewd, unnatural, or lascivious act"
was not vague); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1025 (1972) (holding that reference to an "unnatural and lascivious act" is not vague).
But see Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 254, 599 P.2d 636, 645, 158 Cal. Rptr.
330, 339 (1979) (holding terms "lewd and dissolute conduct" to be unconstitutionally
vague).
126. The Supreme Court tacitly approved such statutes in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1977), by summarily affirming the lower court's ruling that Vir-
ginia's sodomy statute did not violate due process. The summary affirmance may suggest
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Statutes which regulate homosexual solicitation, unlike sod-
omy statutes, regulate speech rather than conduct. As such, they
fall directly within the purview of the first amendment and must
be analyzed quite differently from sodomy laws. Yet, it must be
recognized that regulating solicitation is the primary means of
concomitant regulation of homosexual activity. Because of the
traditionally discreet nature of consensual homosexual acts, ar-
rests for violation of sodomy statutes are extremely rare.' 27 In
California, for example, almost all homosexual arrests result from
violations of public solicitation statutes.' 28 Thus, the control of
lawful homosexual activity through the regulation of speech de-
serves critical inspection.
A. Proscrition of Homosexual Solicitation" A Policy Analysis
There are three purposes underlying proscription of homosex-
ual solicitation: protection of society from a criminal sexual act,
protection from the social effects of homosexuality, and protection
from the effects of the solicitation itself.
The first of these purposes-protecting society from the crime
of engaging in homosexual acts-is served by the common law
crime of solicitation. The crime is not derived from tort, as are
most crimes, for the dominant tort rule regarding sexual proposals
is the familiar "there is no harm in asking."' 129 Rather, the crime
proceeds from the assumption that since sodomy is criminal, solic-
itation to engage in sodomy is incitement to perform a criminal
act. At common law any such solicitation, regardless of the un-
derlying crime involved, was in and of itself criminal.' 30 This ra-
that future due process or equal protection challenges to sodomy statutes are likely to meet
with scant success. For a critical examination of Doe, see Note, Constitutional Protection of
Private Consensual Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes,
62 IOWA L. REv. 568 (1977). For a discussion of the equal protection and due process
implications of homosexuality, see Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private
Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974); Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 117.
127. Two factors contribute to the paucity of sodomy prosecutions. First, officers may
be unable to demonstrate probable cause to suspect criminal activity sufficient to obtain q
search warrant under the fourth amendment. Second, it is unlikely that either participant
in consensual homosexual activity will prosecute the other;, not only does the relationship
between the actors militate against prosecution, but the charging party may well be liable
as an accomplice. See Note, Constitutional Protection ofPrivate Consensual Conduct Among
Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, supra note 126, at 569-70.
128. Project, supra note 5, at 691 n.30 (1966), citedin Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal.
3d 238, 252 n.8, 599 P.2d 636, 644 n.8, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330, 338 n.8 (1979).
129. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Tort, 49 HARV. L.
REv. 1033, 1055 (1936).
130. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIME 219 (7th ed. 1967).
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tionale has been extremely durable in some jurisdictions,
withstanding all constitutional challenges to convictions for solic-
iting criminal sodomy.'31 Conversely, it provides challengers with
ammunition to challenge solicitation statutes in jurisdictions
where sodomy is no longer illegal: if the act for which the solicita-
tion is made is not a crime, then common law solicitation falls of
its own weight.' 3
2
The second purpose of proscribing homosexual solicitation-
protection of society from undesirable social effects-flows from
homosexuality itself. Prohibition of homosexual solicitation, the
argument runs, will inhibit homosexuality, and its undesirable so-
cial effects, by depriving homosexuals of partners. These pur-
ported undesirable effects include the corruption of minors, 33 the
decay of the family unit, 34 the eventual extinction of the human
race, 35 the general degradation of moral welfare, 36 the spread of
venereal disease, 37 and the tension and discord between homo-
131. See, e.g., District of Columbia cases relying heavily on this rationale: United
States v. Carson, 319 A.2d 329 (D.C. App. 1974); United States v. Dumas, 327 A.2d 826
(D.C. App. 1974); Riley v. United States, 298 A.2d 228 (D.C. App. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 840 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 254 599 P.2d 636, 645, 158
Cal. Rptr. 330, 339 (1979), where the California Supreme Court construed CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647 (West 1979), which prohibits solicitation for "lewd or dissolute conduct," to
apply only to solicitation for criminal sexual acts.
133. Corruption of minors is without doubt the most often cited, if not the most credi-
ble, concern. See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 108 (1973);
Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 117, at 587; Note, Constitutional Protection ofPrivate Con-
sensual Conduct Among Consenting Adults." Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, supra note
126, at 587; Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct,
supra note 126, at 1630; Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its
Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623, 628 (1961).
134. See Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 117, at 30 (labeling decay of the family unit
"an emotion-laden argument with no basis in fact.") See also W. BARNETT, supra note
133, at 103; Note, Constitutional Protection of Private Consensual Conduct Among Con-
senting Adults." Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, supra note 126, at 586-87; Note, The
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note 123, at 1634;
Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior. The Crime and Its Enforcement, supra note
133, at 628.
135. See W. BARNETT, supra note 133, at 108; Note, Constitutional Protection of Private
Consensual Conduct Among Consenting Adults Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, supra
note 126, at 588.
136. See Note, supra note 135, at 587. See also Richards, Commercial Sex and the
Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 1195, 1232-34 (1979) (contending that an individual's moral right to individu-
ality is safeguarded by the Constitution from the majority view of what is moral); Note, The
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note 126, at
1635-36.
137. See W. BARNETT, supra note 133, at 100; Note, supra note 135, at 585-86; Note,
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sexuals.' 38  The reality of such effects, and a state's concomitant
right to legislate against them, is debatable.1 39 Further, the pre-
sumption that homosexual solicitation will promote homosexual-
ity among the populace has been criticized repeatedly. As one
author has stated: "As a mechanism for diminishing the practice
or the spread of homosexuality, such [solicitation] laws are pa-
tently ineffective."' 14
0
The third purpose of proscribing homosexual solicitation fo-
cuses upon the effects of the solicitation itself-either the offense it
may cause to the addressee orthe threat of a breach of the peace.
These three rationales for proscription of homosexual solicita-
tion do not neatly align themselves with the statutory means by
which states control such solicitation. In fact, it would appear that
more often than not the states regulate first and justify the regula-
tion later.
B. Proscriotion Through Liquor Control Regulations
A good example of the incongruence between policy and ac-
tual proscription is the administrative device of liquor control reg-
ulations. Many states have regulations which prohibit the holders
of liquor licenses from allowing "persons of ill repute" on the
premises and which forbid "lewdness and . .. indecent or ob-
scene language or conduct.""'4 Purportedly, such regulations flow
from the broad sweep of moral control allowable under the
twenty-first amendment. 142 In practice, however, these regula-
tions have been used to restrict or eliminate homosexual solicita-
tion at a common source - the homosexual bar. Although state
alcoholic beverage control authorities have held that mere congre-
gation of homosexuals or isolated solicitations are sufficient to in-
The Constitutionality ofLaws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note 126, at
1631.
138. See Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and its Enforce-
ment, supra note 133, at 628.
139. See Note, supra note 135, at 587.
140. D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW 131 (1977).
141. Rules 4 and 5 of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, quoted
in One Eleven Wines and Liquors Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 50 N.J.
329, 331, 235 A.2d 12, 14 (1967).
142. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1972) in which regulations prohib-
iting explicit live sexual entertainment in establishments of licensees were held to be a valid
exercise of power under the twenty-first amendment. Section 2 of the twenty-first amend-
ment reads: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
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voke the regulations, 43 some courts have required a showing of
"disorder"' 44 or behavior amounting to a nuisance 14 5 before re-
voking the license of the proprietor of a homosexual bar.
The significance of these regulations is not in the evidentiary
requirements imposed by them-such as a showing of "disorder";
it is in the rationales which courts have relied upon to justify these
regulations. Rather than relying exclusively on the power of the
states to regulate morals, courts have suggested that liquor control
can be accomplished through regulation of offensive expression:
"[A] fair and sensible regulation. . .[can prohibit] overtly inde-
cent conduct and public displays of sexual desires manifestly of-
fensive to currently acceptable standards of propriety."'146
Court rulings on liquor control regulation illustrate the shot-
gun approach to justification: the courts speak in terms of "moral-
ity," "disorder" (meaning a breach of the peace) and "offense."
This approach fails to pair the justification with the harm to be
prevented. If a state agency is to protect the solicitee's sensibili-
ties, then it is justified in prohibiting offensive conduct; if
lawmakers wish to maintain order, then they are justified in
prohibiting "breach of the peace;" but if public morality is the
target, courts ought not to allow it to be regulated under the guise
of liquor control. By allowing a regulation to overreach its puta-
tive purpose, a court sanctions overbreadth. Although a state may
legitimately regulate "immoral conduct" '14  it may not, without
143. See Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 371, 247 N.E.2d 901
(1969) (overruling a revocation of a liquor license based entirely on isolated solicitations
occurring on the premises); One Eleven Wines and Liquors Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 50 N.J. 329, 340, 235 A.2d 12, 16 (1967) (overruling a revocation of a
liquor license based solely on congregation of homosexuals on the premises).
144. E.g., Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 111, 233 N.E.2d
833, 286 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1967) (homosexual solicitation of policeman held insufficient to
establish "disorder"). Cf Becker v. State Liquor Auth. 21 N.Y.2d 289, 234 N.E.2d 443, 287
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1967) (patrons feeling each other's genitals constituted "disorder").
145. E.g., In re Revocation of License of Clock Bar Inc., 85 Dauph. 125, 39 Pa. D & C
2d 667 (1966) (establishing nuisance through laissez-faire attitude of licensee to homosex-
ual activities).
146. One Eleven Wines and Liquors Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 50
N.J. 329, 342, 235 A.2d 12, 19 (1967). See also Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Bever-
age Control, 53 Cal.2d 313, 319, 347 P.2d 909, 912, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (1959) ("There are
many things that can be done in the privacy of the home which may not be illegal, but if
done in a public tavern are offensive ... ").
147. State power to regulate "immoral conduct" may also be subject to constitutional
qualification. As Justice Marshall stated: "There is not a word in [the history] of the
twenty-first amendment which indicates Congress meant to tamper in any way with First
Amendment rights." California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 134 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
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more, concomitantly regulate offensive speech.' 48 Thus, when a
liquor control regulation is construed by a court to permit license
revocation because homosexual solicitation takes place on the li-
censee's premises, that court improvidently muddles the regula-
tion's constitutionality.
Notwithstanding constitutional difficulties, reliance on liquor
control regulations may be an ineffective manner by which to
carry out any of the three purposes of proscribing homosexual so-
licitation. One author has questioned the causal connection be-
tween gay bar crackdowns and the elimination of homosexual
activity; "[A]lthough an increase in homosexuality may increase
the demand for homosexual bars, the bars can scarcely be said to
produce homosexuals."' 49 The predominantly homosexual clien-
tele of such bars is not likely to take umbrage at the goings-on
there. Moreover, outsiders who may happen upon these bars are
not a captive audience; they may, in thq words of the Cohen
Court, "effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibili-
ties simply by averting their eyes,"' 50 or more likely, by going
elsewhere.
Although the liquor control device suffers from the foregoing
practical and constitutional infirmities, it is nonetheless grounded
in the liquor control authority accorded the states by the twenty-
first amendment, and delegated by the states to their administra-
tive agencies. Statutory devices for controlling homosexual solici-
tation, which have no such constitutional foundation, must be
analyzed separately.
C. Other Statutory Devices for Proscribing
Homosexual Solicitation
One statutory device which, like liquor control, indirectly at-
tacks solicitation is the codified common law of nuisance. For ex-
ample, in Harris v. United States, 5' the proprietor of a
"homosexual health club" was convicted of "keeping a bawdy or
disorderly house."' 52 The court observed that the "disorderly
house" provisions were a codification of common law nuisance
148. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), discussed in text accompanying
notes 46-58 supra.
149. E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 87 (1965).
150. 403 U.S. at 21.
151. 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. App. 1974).
152. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2722 (West 1973).
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per se. 1 53 Ruling that the acts in question were public, not private,
and consequently a nuisance, the court applied the statute in order
to sustain the proprietor's conviction.
Loitering or disorderly conduct legislation is a more general-
ized means of proscribing homosexual solicitation. The Model
Penal Code provides a ready example: "A person is guilty of a
petty misdemeanor if he loiters in or near any public place for the
purpose of soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate sexual
relations."' 5 4  As the comment to the provision notes, it is
designed to prevent "open flouting of prevailing moral standards
as a sort of nuisance in public thoroughfares and parks."' 55
The language of the Model Penal Code has been adopted in a
number of states. 56 However, in People v. Gibson,t57 Colorado's
version of the Model Penal Code provision was struck down. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that because the statute by its terms
did not require the loitering to include an overt act, such as solicit-
ing, it unconstitutionally prohibited the mere state of mind of a
person who wished to solicit another "to engage in deviate sexual
relations."' 58
An interesting variation on the use of loitering legislation is
contained in the disorderly conduct section of the Final Report of
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 15
which prohibits "loitering in a public place for the purpose of
soliciting sexual contact [and] solicit[ing] such contact."'' 60 The Fi-
nal Report designates this offense a misdemeanor, whereas all
other disorderly conduct is accorded the status of an infraction.' 6'
Nevertheless, the Final Report requires overt conduct in the form
153. Common law nuisance per se is defined in Harris as "a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances." 315 A.2d at 572 (quoting Bader v. Iowa Metropolitan Sewer
Co., 178 N.W.2d 305, 306 (1970)).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
156. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2914(l)(e) (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1321(5) (1979);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(3) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
157. 184 Colo. 444, 521 P.2d 774 (1974) (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-9-113(2) (1971) held
unconstitutional on due process grounds).
158. For a discussion of other constitutional problems of the Model Penal Code, see
notes 186-87 infra and accompanying text.
159. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fi-
NAL REPORT]. The Commission's suggested reforms currently are stalled in Congress. See
generally Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: issues, Tactics, and Prospecs, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1977).
160. FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at § 1861(I)(t).
161. Id. § 1861(2).
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of an actual solicitation. Even more significantly, it requires that
any arrest under the statute be preceded by a complaint from a
solicitee who is not a police decoy.' 62 This requirement may well
alleviate any due process challenges to such a statute.'
63
Of course the most direct method of dealing with homosexual
solicitation is simply to prohibit it, as Ohio has done: "No person
shall solicit another person of the same sex to engage in sexual
activity with the offendor when the offendor knows such solicita-
tion is offensive to the other person or is reckless in that re-
gard."' 64 The Ohio statute is unique in two respects: first, it
directly forbids solicitation without relying on theories of loiter-
ing, disorderly conduct, or nuisance; second, its sole justification
seems to be protection of the sensibilities of the solicitee. How-
ever, the Ohio statute has not been construed consistently with
this justification. Rather, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v.165p
Phipps, 165 construed the statute to apply to,"fighting words," and
relied on the threat of a breach of the peace as its justification.
The foregoing survey of statutory schemes has served to intro-
duce variations on the theme of regulating homosexual solicita-
tion. A more detailed constitutional. analysis of the different
statutory schemes follows.
D. Solicitation and Constitutional Guarantees
Statutory devices of regulating solicitation-except for liquor
control, which has its source in the twenty-first amendment-must
be reconciled with a variety of constitutional guarantees. This
subsection focuses on the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, and on the first amendment's protection of
speech. 1
66
162. Id. § 1861(4).
163. See notes 167-71 infra and accompanying text.
164. OHo REv. CODE § 2907.07(B) (Page 1976). Ohio is a jurisdiction where homosex-
ual conduct is not prohibited by law.
165. 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979), discussed at notes 5-10 supra and
accompanying text.
166. This Note does not examine the impact of the equal protection guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment on the regulation of homosexuality. Equal protection problems do
exist, however, where a state directly prohibits homosexual solicitations, see, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE § 2907.07(B) (Page 1976), but not heterosexual solicitations, though they are
equally likely to be "offensive" to an unwilling solicitee.
Another issue in this area is whether homosexuality should be considered a "suspect
classification." For a forceful argument that it should be so considered, see Chaitin & Lef-
court, supra note 117. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Laws .Forbidding Private
Homosexual Conduct, supra note 126.
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The statutes and ordinances discussed previously are difficult
to enforce simply because homosexual solicitations are generally
discreet and circumspect, and citizen complaints are rare. There-
fore, in order to make arrests, it has become common for police to
pose as "decoy" solicitees. 167 This practice arguably violates the
solicitor's right of procedural due process. Consequently, some
courts have ruled that the testimony of a single officer who wit-
nessed the solicitation is insufficient for a conviction. Other courts
have gone so far as to label decoy arrests "entrapment," 68 arguing
that any solicitation requires at least some affirmative re-
sponse-in words or gestures-from the decoy-addressee. 169
The practice of using police decoys, coupled with its potential
for entrapping offenders, not only denies procedural due proc-
ess 170 but more generally undermines public confidence in police.
It has also been suggested that the victimless character of a homo-
sexual solicitation makes such solicitation an unworthy object of
police attention. 1 Consequently, procedural due process can be
preserved by a narrowly drawn statute which requires a citizen
complaint. Such a statute would eliminate any issue of police en-
trapment.
Less easily remedied are the constitutional problems of con-
trolling homosexual solicitation through regulation of speech.
The Supreme Court has allowed generous breathing space for the
exercise of first amendment freedoms to foreclose any deterrent
chilling effect.' 72 Thus, any statute which restricts speech-such
167. See D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 140, at 130.
168. Eg. Rittenauer v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. App. 1960), where a
police decoy phoned the defendant, went to his home, and led the defendant to believe he
was homosexual. Such encouragement of the defendant's subsequent solicitation for sod-
omy was termed entrapment.
Generally, entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates with the officials of
the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they might prosecute."
Sorrel v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). Entrapment constitutes a defense even if
the defendant is otherwise guilty of the crime, since its purpose is to deter enforcement
officials from such conduct. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 369-74
(1972).
169. See D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 140, at 136, where it is suggested
that solicitations seldom take place without some encouragement on the part of the solic-
itee-presumably in the form of the solicitee's bearing, body language, or facial expression.
170. See Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforce-
ment, supra note 133, at 635.
171. See Note, Constitutional Protection of Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting
Adults." Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, supra note 126, at 589.
172. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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as a solicitation provision-should be viewed unfavorably ab ini-
lio.
However, the presumption against the constitutionality of a
regulation of speech may be unwarranted where the chilling effect
on protected speech is de minimis. 173 While some commentators
have contended that homosexual solicitation provisions do little if
anything to chill protected speech, 174 data concerning homosexu-
ality are still too incomplete 75 to support this conclusion. Thus, it
would be premature to suggest that the presumption raised against
homosexual solicitation laws in deference to "breathing space" is
unwarranted and improper. 176 Moreover, where the rationale un-
derlying a solicitation statute is offense to the sensibilities of the
hearer, the presence of a chilling effect is immaterial. After Co-
hen, 177 close scrutiny is required because the offensive expression
itself may be protected by the first amendment.
A special constitutional problem is presented by the regulation
of homosexual solicitation in reformed jurisdictions where con-
sensual homosexual acts are no longer criminal. 178  The logical
inconsistency is obvious: how can two people perform a legal con-
sensual act without one first asking the other to do so? 179 In con-
173. See the quotation in text accompanying note 65 supra.
174. D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, supra note 140, at 131-32.
175. See note 114 supra.
176. Cf. the "substantial overbreadth" argument in Note, supra note 75, at 859 (assert-
ing that while even the most carefully drawn statutes may have a chilling effect on pro-
tected activity, only substantial overbreadth creates the minimum degree of chilling to raise
a presumption of invalidity).
177. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
178. Consensual homosexual acts have been decriminalized in the following jurisdic-
tions: Alaska, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1, 1980); California, 1975 Cal.
Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (approved July 1, 1976); Colorado, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 121, § 1
(approved June 2, 1971); Connecticut, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts § 28, § 214 (effective Oct. 1,
1971); Delaware, 58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § 1 (effective Apr. 1, 1973); Hawaii, 1972 Haw.
Sess. Laws, act 9, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1973); Illinois, 1961 I11. Laws, p. 1983, § 11-2 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1962); Indiana, 1976 Ind. Act, P.L. 148, § 24 (effective July 1, 1977); Iowa, 1976
Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 520 (effective Jan. 1, 1978); Maine, 1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499 § 5 (effec-
tive Mar. 1, 1976); Nebraska, 1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38, § 328 (effective July 1, 1978); New
Hampshire, 1973 N.H. Laws, 532:26, x (effective Nov. 1, 1973); New Jersey, 1979 N.J. Laws
ch. 95 (effective Sept. 1, 1979); New Mexico, 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8; North Dakota,
1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 122, § I (approved Mar. 19, 1977); Ohio, 1972 Ohio Laws, 134 v
H 511, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1974); Oregon, 1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1972); South Dakota, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr. 1,
1977); Vermont, 1977 Vt. Acts, No. 51, § 3 (effective July 1, 1977); Washington, 1975 Wash.
Laws, 1st exec. sess., ch. 260 (effective July 1, 1976); West Virginia, 1976 W. Va. Acts, ch.
43 (effective June II, 1976); Wyoming, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3 (effective May 27,
1977). See Rivera, supra note 119, at 950-51 app. A, pt. 2.
179. But see notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
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stitutional terms, how can an act (solicitation) which is a
prerequisite to a legal act (homosexual relations) be illegal and
remain within the bounds of due process?
One court has confronted this problem and refused to validate
its state's solicitation statute in the face of decriminalization of ho-
mosexual relations. 180 Another court has limited application of its
state's law to solicitation for public, not private acts.' 81 In re-
formed jurisdictions, common law criminal solicitation simply is
inapplicable to a solicitation for private consensual sodomy be-
cause the underlying criminal act is not a crime, and the solicitor
therefore lacks the requisite, criminal mental element. Likewise,
such jurisdictions can hardly cite the untoward social effects of
homosexuality as justification for their solicitation provisions
when their legislatures have decriminalized homosexual relations.
Yet solicitation provisions continue to be upheld in reformed
jurisdictions. State v. Phpps,182 for example, was decided in Ohio,
which repealed its consensual sodomy legislation in 1974.183 The
Ohio Supreme Court's affirmance was grounded in the fighting
words doctrine-apparently the only rationale which had any
conceptual consistency.
E. Solutions. The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
The vagueness doctrine 8 4 is not generally useful in scrutiniz-
ing the constitutional defects of homosexual solicitation statutes.
Those statutes which regulate solicitation directly are not "so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
their meaning." '185 For example, the Model Penal Code direct
regulation provision, which prohibits loitering in a "public place"
for the purpose of soliciting "deviate sexual relations," defines
both terms. 186 Consequently, state enactments of the Code provi-
sion are not prone to vagueness attacks; courts confronted with
them may well be confined to reversing isolated convictions in
which due process has been denied rather than facially invalidat-
180. People v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 447, 521 P.2d 774 (1974).
181. Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 254, 599 P.2d 636, 645-46, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 330, 339-40 (1979).
182. 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes
5-10 supra.
183. 1972 Ohio Laws, 134 v H 511, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
184. See text accompanying notes 60-73 supra.
185. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967).
186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The terms "public
place" and "deviate sexual relations" are defined in §§ 251.2 and 213.2, respectively.
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ing such a statute.8 7  Similarly, the Ohio statute involved in
Phopps ss speaks unambiguously, using such terms as "same sex"
and "sexual activity,"8 9 and thus, with the exception of the term
"offensive,"' 90 cannot be considered vague. 191
The term "offensive" may create difficulties under the rule of
Cohen that offensive expression is not per se unprotected. Such
problems arise, however, only when an individual is prosecuted
for making offensive statements which Cohen protects; thus, the
word "offensive" is the basis of an attack for overbreadth, not
vagueness.
In general, a challenge based on overbreadth, which questions
whether the regulation includes within its ambit protected as well
as unprotected activity, is likely to prove more fruitful. Initially it
must be determined whether the actor's conduct falls within the
regulation's legitimate sweep. If so, the defendant may be re-
quired to assert that the regulation is substantially overbroad.
After Gooding, the question is likely to be framed as follows: does
a homosexual solicitation statute legitimately proscribe "fighting
words," or does it sweep too broadly by including the use of lan-
guage calculated not to offend but to endear?
To sustain an overbreadth analysis, a court invoking Gooding
as precedent would likely assume that some homosexual solicita-
tion to some solicitee could constitute "fighting words." The most
liberal definition appears in Justice Powell's dissent in Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, where "fighting words" extends to "the willful use of
scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an un-
willing audience."' 92 However, it should be clear that Justice
187. See City of Columbus v. Scott, 47 Ohio App. 2d 287, 291, 353 N.E.2d 858, 861
(1975).
State enactments of the Model Penal Code provision suffer from conceptual invalidity
in reformed jurisdictions. See notes 178-81 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, such
provisions may violate due process; by failing to require an actual solicitation, they have
been held to punish a mere state of mind. See notes 154-57 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., People v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 446, 521 P.2d 774 (1974).
188. 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes
5-10 supra.
189. OHio REV. CODE § 2907.07(B) (Page 1976).
190. Though the term "offensive" seemingly is vague, the Phops court insisted that it is
"commonly understood by men of common intelligence." 58 Ohio St. 2d at 274, 389 N.E.
2d at 1131.
191. But see City of Columbus v. Scott, 47 Ohio App. 2d 287, 353 N.E.2d 858 (1975)
(ordinance having language nearly identical to that of the Ohio statute in Phipps held void
for vagueness).
192. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
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Powell's definition is simply the converse of a homosexual propo-
sition. Regardless of how vulgar or crude the solicitor's words
may be, the end is not to offend; on the contrary, the solicitor's
intent is to stimulate or to persuade the solicitee. As one court has
characterized it, a homosexual solicitation is closer to "loving
words" than "fighting words."'' 3
Under the more restrictive definition in Cohen 114 it is equally
difficult to imagine a solicitation which constitutes "fighting
words." Cohen required a showing of an objectively legitimate
affront to the actual addressee's sensibilities, sufficiently strong to
provoke an immediate violent reaction.'95 Certainly the average
heterosexual may be disgusted rather than sexually stimulated by
a homosexual proposition, but it is a great leap to say that a ho-
mosexual proposition will trigger the uncontrollably violent re-
sponse contemplated by Cohen. As offensive as a homosexual
solicitation might be to a heterosexual, it is unlikely to incite an
average listener to a breach of the peace. 196
The Gooding decision allows a court to rescue an overbroad
statute by construing it so as to apply only when constitutionally
proper. When so construed, a solicitation statute may well not
shield the sensibilities of the hearer since, under Cohen, expres-
sion which offends but does not reach the level of "fighting words"
is sheltered by the first amendment. The statute prohibits only
solicitations which are proven as a matter offact to amount to
"fighting words." It is difficult to conceive of the "loving words"
of a solicitation as "fighting words," but the Ohio Supreme Court
in Phips apparently has done so. 197
Once a solicitation is construed to equal "fighting words," the
question arises whether that construction will escape invalidation
upon review. The decision in Lewis 1198 suggests not. There, on
remand of Lewis 1 199 in light of Gooding, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana construed its breach of the peace statute to apply to any
193. City of Columbus v. Scott, 47 Ohio App. 2d 287, 291, 353 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1975).
194. 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
195. 403 U.S. at 571-72.
196. One writer notes: "Although little is known of the impact of such disgust [at ho-
mosexuality] it is probably occasional and fleeting, and not so upsetting to significant num-
bers that it interferes with their daily lives." Note, Private Consensual Homosexual
Behavior. The Crime and Its Enforcement, supra note 133, at 628.
197. 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes
5-10 supra.
198. 415 U.S. 130 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
199. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 98-100 supra.
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expression found by a jury to be "fighting words." The Supreme
Court in Lewis II overruled this construction and struck down the
statute in its entirety, commenting only that the construction was
not "meaningful."2" More instructive, perhaps, is Justice Doug-
las' dissent in Lucas v. Arkansas,2° ' where he argued that any con-
struction of an overbroad statute was insufficient and that a
remand in light of Gooding was pointless deference to state courts.
In short, a court faced with an apparently overbroad solicita-
tion provision has two options: holding as a matter of law that all
homosexual solicitations are "fighting words""2 2 or construing the
provisions to apply only to "fighting words" as determined by a
jury. The former option strains reality; the latter may not survive
appellate review. Precisely which path a court should follow is
discussed below.
III. PROSCRIPTION OF HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATION:
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
Most solicitation statutes are construed to prohibit offensive
expression which, because it does not amount to "fighting words,"
should be protected under Cohen2 °3 and Gooding.4  Such situa-
tions are rare. Further, since most arrests occur through the use of
a police decoy,20 5 due process may require that convictions be lim-
ited to those in which a private citizen is the solicitee. 0 6
Such cases as Cohen and Gooding may, however, share a con-
sideration articulated first in Chaplinsky and reiterated by Justice
Powell, dissenting in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey:2°7 the protection of
200. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
201. 416 U.S. 919, 928 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed in text accompanying
note 115 supra.
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE 7 (Tent. Draft 13, 1961) (commentary to Art. 250). One
court has stated that such a determination is more amenable to legislative resolution. Peo-
ple v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 447, 521 P.2d 774, 775 (1974).
203. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
204. See notes 89-96 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
206. It is possible to avoid such limitations by holding as a matter of law that a homo-
sexual proposition constitutes "fighting words." However, such a decision would produce
serious inequity-any solicitation, no matter how discreet, would be criminal. See Pryor v.
Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 254-55 n.ll, 599 P.2d 636, 646 n.ll, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330,
340 n. 11 (1979). Furthermore, to equate homosexual solicitation with fighting words as a
matter of law would be a repudiation of the limitations imposed by Cohen on the purview
of "fighting words."
207. 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting), discussed in text accompanying
note 104 supra.
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citizens from intentional, severely offensive, and emotionally
debilitating language.
Certainly, Justice Harlan was correct when he observed that
"one man's vulgarity is another man's lyric." 20 8 But when that
vulgarity seriously offends the listener or causes him emotional
distress, the state has a legitimate interest in punishing the
speaker. At most times and in most places, a homosexual's propo-
sition to a heterosexual is annoying at worst, and quite unlikely to
constitute "fighting words." But should an indiscreet or outra-
geous proposition cause serious damage to an unwilling solicitee,
the solicitor should not be shielded from liability by the first
amendment. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes
a distinction between "sensibilities" and emotional stability:
when "[o]ne who by extreme or outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. .. .
he is liable to the victim. Arguably, any speaker whose solicita-
tion causes "severe emotional distress" should also be criminally
liable to the state.
It is apparent that the Gooding decision, in effectuating the Co-
hen definition of "fighting words," was aimed at curbing the
abuses which an overbroad statute invites by narrowing its appli-
cation to specified constitutional limits. A legislature may achieve
the same result-and avoid judicial invalidation-by enacting leg-
islation which is narrowly drawn to protect this single legitimate
"sensibilities" interest, and which is enforceable only against
heedless violators, not homosexuals in general. What follows are
proposals for such legislation.210
First, the statute should be drafted to prohibit only those solic-
itations which cause severe emotional disturbance, perhaps incor-
porating a speech-related variation of the Restatement of Torts
language quoted above. This statutory language is far more pre-
cise than "offensive" or "opprobrious"--words which have been
held to be overbroad.
Second, in order to guard against discriminatory enforcement
208. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) discussed in text accompanying notes
46-58 supra.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). Whether or not a given homo-
sexual solicitation constitutes "extreme and outrageous conduct" would be a question of
fact. However, the comment to § 46 indicates that the standard is fixed at the point at
which "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim 'Outrageous!'" Id. comment d.
210. Several of these proposals were suggested by Mr. Arthur Warner of the National
Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties in a telephone conversation October 15, 1979.
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and to assure congruence between the legislature's objective and
its means of control, the statute should require a private citizen's
complaint containing specific allegations of emotional injury.'I
Such a requirement would shelter the statute from charges of offi-
cial harassment and entrapment which arise from the use of police
decoys. Similarly, by requiring an actual solicitation rather than
simple loitering with intent to solicit, the problem of punishing a
mere state of mind would be alleviated. 2
Finally, the statute should be properly characterized as an
"harassment" prohibition, unrelated to particular disorderly con-
duct or sexual offenses. The purpose of this designation would be
to prohibit intentional infliction of emotional damage regardless
of the sexual proclivities of the speaker. As a further step, homo-
sexual solicitation should be excised from "public lewdness" pro-
visions and placed in narrow solicitation statutes which would
prohibit language, not conduct.
By following such guidelines, a legislature can produce a pre-
cisely drafted statute directed toward a reasonable and constitu-
tional end: the security of citizens from severely offensive or
emotionally distressing sexual propositions. Should such proposi-
tions prove to be "fighting words," an unlikely event, they would
be better prosecuted under a disorderly conduct provision
designed to guard against a breach of the peace. By thus correlat-
ing a state's legitimate interest in the peace of its streets with spe-
cific statutory language, a legislature can supplant antiquated
prejudice with respect for the established position of homosexuals
in society, yet maintain the fundamental priorities of a civilized
legal system.
THOMAS E. LODGE
211. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at § 1861(4).
212. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
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